The Republican victory in the recent US election is being celebrated in the Sahel. Many there see President Donald Trump as an “anti-imperialist”, “peacemaker” and “advocate of traditional values”. These perceptions are shaped by local neo-sovereignist narratives.
In 2024, a Nigerien protests against the U.S. military presence, holding a sign that reads " This is not Washington, it's Agadez ", Niger April 13, 2024. Today, the new Trump administration is popular among many in the Sahel region.
© picture alliance / REUTERS | Mahamadou Hamidou
Neither in Donald Trump’s election campaigns nor during his first term in office did Africa play a significant role. As US president, Trump did not once visit the continent and only received two African presidents in the White House during his first term in office. At the same time, stricter entry requirements enforced by Trump – specifically for citizens from states with mainly Muslim populations – concerned many African countries such as Chad, Mali and Nigeria. And Trump’s derogatory, racist remarks about African countries, which he made in the course of discussions about a more restrictive US migration policy, caused a furore on the continent.
Despite all this, Trump is popular in West Africa’s Sahel region. As one civil society activist recently told me: “We're all Trumpists here.” For many in the region, he stands for one thing above all: the respect for the national sovereignty of African states. Based on an analysis of debates in social networks and local media in Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali as well as interviews with civil society actors and government officials in Niger, three interlocking local narratives can be identified that shape this perception.
First of all, many people in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger welcome the “America First” policy of the new US administration, which they see as ideologically close to the nationalist-sovereignist agendas of their own military governments. They perceive Trump’s isolationism and the termination of international alliances as a departure from a standard Western foreign policy approach, which they condemn as interventionist and neo-colonial. Trump is seen as a partner who, contrary to his predecessor Joe Biden and many European governments, does not interfere in the internal affairs of African states – because this is precisely what both the military regimes and large sections of the populations in the Sahel accuse Western states of having done when they paused cooperation programmes in the region following the coups and tried to push for a swift return to a democratic order.
It is true that the US administration under Biden – contrary to the European Union – chose a pragmatic approach in dealing with the new rulers in the Sahel, not least to pursue its own security interests in the region. However, the relationship between the United States and the coup leaders has remained tense. In Niger, the United States – which had been operating a drone base there since 2019 – attempted to persuade the military junta to present a transition roadmap in order to resume the military partnership after its initial suspension, and to ensure that more than 1,000 US soldiers could remain in the country. But the efforts were in vain. At a meeting in Niamey in March 2024, Niger’s new rulers accused a US delegation of maintaining a condescending attitude during the negotiations and ordered the withdrawal of the US troops.
Under Trump, however, many in the Sahel now believe that a transactional partnership could be established with the United States – similar to that with Russia – which would be profitable for both sides. The hope is that this partnership will not be tied to political conditionalities which contradict the new socio-political realities in the Sahel. Despite the devastating consequences for the populations in the region, many see Trump’s radical cuts in foreign aid, which are also seen by the coup governments as an obstacle to an “endogenous” development agenda, as proof that Trump stands for a fair reorganization of relations between the West and the Global South. The argument is that foreign aid weakens state responsibility and provides a breeding ground for corruption and personal profit.
The narrative of Trump’s role as a global peacemaker also contributes to his popularity in the Sahel. Many welcome first of all his attempts to distance the United States from the NATO defence alliance, whose military intervention in Libya in 2011 led to the “Balkanization” of the Sahel. What is meant by this is the breakup of regional security arrangements following the fall of former Libyan ruler Muammar Gaddafi, which encouraged a resurrection of insurgent, separatist forces and the spread of jihadist groups in the Sahel.
Trump’s populist rhetoric about quickly ending the conflict between Russia and Ukraine has furthermore awakened the belief that the security situation in the Sahel would also improve under his second term in office. This is because many fear that ongoing geopolitical rivalries and the battle for global zones of influence between the West and Russia could worsen conflicts in the region. Reports of Ukraine’s support for Malian separatist groups have fuelled this concern. Both the Malian army and the Russian Wagner mercenary group suffered heavy losses in the battle for the northern Malian town of Tinzaouaten in July 2024.
The statement made by US Congressman Scott Perry in early February 2025 that American taxpayers’ money had been used to finance the terrorist group Boko Haram, which is active in the Sahel, is seen by many as an additional sign that the United States under Trump is seeking a change of course that would help to resolve the conflicts in the region. This is because the claim echoes a conspiracy myth that has long been widespread in the Sahel, according to which jihadist violence is the result of targeted destabilization attempts by the West. The military regimes in the Sahel also use this reasoning to legitimize their takeover of power. For example, the Burkinabe coup leader, Ibrahim Traoré, claimed in his speech to the nation in December 2023 that the terrorism there was the “apogee of imperialism and neo-colonialism”. Many people in the Sahel now see Perry’s statements as a validation of their interpretation. Even Mali’s military junta responded promptly with a communiqué endorsing the accusations and calling for legal action.
Another line of argumentation in favour of Trump in the Sahel praises the new US president as an advocate of traditional values. In particular, Trump’s election promise of a rigorous crackdown on diversity programmes and LGBTQ rights resonated well in the region. The military regimes have also adopted this agenda. Shortly after taking power, in October 2023, for example, Niger’s new rulers proclaimed their intention to take decisive action against “subversive attempts” by a “foreign power” to strengthen LGBTQ rights in Niger – rights that, according to the regime, contradicted the country’s religious and cultural values. Burkina Faso’s junta announced a ban on homosexual acts in July 2024, while a corresponding bill came into force in Mali in December of the same year.
Even though neo-sovereignist narratives dominate the discourse on the new US administration in the Sahel, by no means is everyone in the region a Trumpist. However, given the severe restrictions on freedom of expression, dissenting views are rare in public debates. Two exceptions can be observed. On the one hand, local humanitarian actors in particular have warned of the disastrous consequences of the cuts in US foreign aid for the populations affected by multiple crises in the Sahel, even if they have been condemned as imperialist agents and traitors by supporters of the military regimes. On the other hand, even voices loyal to the regimes described Trump’s plans expressed in February 2025 to turn the Gaza Strip into a “Mediterranean Riviera” as “crazy”.
The extent to which the euphoria over Trump’s election will continue in the Sahel is more than questionable. Wishful thinking can be caught up and overtaken by political realities. This can already be observed in the Sahel with regard to the neo-sovereignist mirage propagated by the military regimes in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Promises to improve the security situations and living conditions of the populations there have not been fulfilled. Growing dissatisfaction is therefore also likely to sooner or later cloud perceptions about Trump in the Sahel.
Lisa Tschörner is a Researcher at Megatrends Afrika and an Associate in the Africa and Middle East Research Division at SWP.
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