Following the presidential elections in Mozambique, youthful mass protests against the alleged electoral fraud perpetrated by the ruling party FRELIMO have erupted. Tensions are exacerbated by police violence. There is a risk of further escalation, which could lead to civil war.
Protesters hold a banner with the face of Venancio Mondlane, independent candidate for the presidency of Mozambique during a "national shutdown" against the election outcome, in Maputo, Mozambique, November 7, 2024.
© picture alliance / REUTERS | Siphiwe Sibeko
On October 9, 2024, Mozambique elected a new president. One day after the election, the independent candidate Venâncio Mondlane, who is supported by the Optimist Party for the Development of Mozambique (PODEMOS), which was founded in May, declared himself president. The national electoral commission, however, declared Daniel Chapo, the candidate of the ruling party, FRELIMO, the winner of the election with 70.67 per cent of the vote. Mondlane, who is particularly popular with the young population, only received 20.32 per cent of the vote, according to the electoral commission. The final results are expected to be published on 23 December.
In light of these results, Mondlane accuses the government of electoral fraud. Not without justification: opposition parties, civil society organizations, and the influential Mozambican Bishops' Conference speak of serious irregularities. The EU, too, has pointed out irregularities in the elections, but remains much more reserved in its wording than the Commonwealth countries, for example, which have identified serious irregularities. The Southern African Development Community (SADC), on the other hand, declared that the elections were conducted in an orderly manner.
Political tensions intensified further after two PODEMOS party officials were shot dead by unknown assailants. The EU, the USA and other Western countries strongly condemned the murder, while the SADC merely called for an investigation.
In fact, the official results are not very credible. Research carried out by this author before the elections suggested that a vast majority of interviewees were dissatisfied with FRELIMO and said that they wanted to vote for Mondlane. Others emphasized that they did not even want to go to the polls, as FRELIMO was not prepared to relinquish power anyway. This resignation is also reflected in the low voter turnout of 43 per cent.
Allegations of electoral fraud are nothing new, and have repeatedly led to tensions since the introduction of multi-party elections in 1994. In 2013, disputed election results led to armed clashes between FRELIMO and RENAMO, the second largest party at the time. Observers therefore always regard elections as a litmus test for the stability of peace in the former civil war country (1977-1992). What is new, however, is that the accusations are being made publicly by large sections of the population.
Against the backdrop of suspected electoral fraud, Mondlane called for a nationwide general strike and peaceful protests on October 21, which were followed by large sections of the population in all parts of the country, despite the fact that Mondlane has only been orchestrating the various phases of protests via social media platforms. He himself is currently in an unknown location.
There are two main reasons why young people are taking to the streets: First, the older generation who lived through the civil war – those older than 35 years – still have the memories of war and therefore fear a new conflict. The younger generation has not witnessed the war and is ready to fight for better social and political conditions. Secondly, with Mondlane there now is a leader coordinating the protests and giving one thing above all to the young demonstrators: hope.
The protests were triggered by election fraud. However, they built on years of growing dissatisfaction with the FRELIMO government, which is accused of lining its own pockets rather than creating economic development and prospects for the population. This has also been underlined in recent strikes by teachers and doctors demanding better salaries. Young people in particular, who make up 80 per cent of Mozambique’s population, are no longer willing to accept FRELIMO’s authoritarian policies. They are pinning their hopes on Mondlane and his party, PODEMOS, whose acronym hopefully means “We Can Do It” (Podemos).
The police have met the largely peaceful protests with repression. Hundreds have been injured since the demonstrations began, at least 130 people have died at the hands of the police, and several thousand demonstrators have been arrested. This has led to an escalation of the situation and a radicalization of the demonstrators. This is evident from an increasing number of attacks on police stations and FRELIMO administrative buildings throughout the country – including in Gaza province, which was previously considered a FRELIMO stronghold. This shows the great potential for escalation in the current situation, which seems irreversible if the government does not change its strategy.
From today’s perspective, there are four possible scenarios for the outcome of the protests. They depend largely on the government’s stance and the official election results, which the Electoral Commission intends to publish on December 23.
Should the preliminary election results be confirmed, it is conceivable that Mondlane and the demonstrators will accept the results and end the protests, especially as the financial impact of the protests is increasingly felt by the population. However, this is rather unlikely.
If the current election results are confirmed but the protests continue, and the government continues its strategy of ongoing repression against demonstrators and supporters of civil society, there will be a further escalation with unpredictable consequences. This seems very likely at the moment, as there is no sign of a de-escalation strategy.
A third conceivable scenario would be the annulment of the elections. On the one hand, this could restore voter confidence. On the other hand, Mondlane, who has since been charged with conspiracy and crimes against national security for the protests, would be denied a new candidacy. This could significantly exacerbate the situation.
The fourth scenario would be even more dramatic: a political assassination of Mondlane. This would mean that the population would have lost a leader, which could lead to the protests subsiding. However, it is more likely that this would lead to an escalating spiral of violence in view of the already advanced stage of escalation, which could be the beginning of a civil war. Given the number of politically motivated murders in Mozambique’s history, this scenario is at least not unlikely and is feared by parts of the population.
The crisis can only be resolved through political and structural changes. Above all, the government must accept an honest election result. It is not certain whether Mondlane actually won the election. What is certain, however, is that he has a significantly higher share of the vote anda victory is also entirely conceivable. This is backed by the strong support from the ongoing protests by citizens who followed his strike announcements that temporarily paralyzed the entire country. Further, the fact that, according to the author’s pre-election research, a large majority said they would vote for Mondlane also strongly suggests the possibility of a Mondlane victory. Recognizing the will of the voters would lead to an end to the protests, provided this happens promptly.
In the long term, fundamental changes are necessary to ensure that transparent elections are held. This includes a truly independent electoral commission, the separation of party and state and the strengthening of the rule of law in a country that has so far been characterized by close ties between party, state and business. In this case, there would be a historic opportunity to bring about political change and strengthen peace and democracy in Mozambique in the long term.
However, the rigid power structures and the lack of international support for the protests, including from Western countries, could destroy the chance for change and increase the risk of the situation escalating. The SADC, which convened a special meeting on November 7 to address the escalating situation in Mozambique, not only endorsed the election outcome, but also remained cautious in its criticism of the police violence.
To change the government’s mindset, Germany and the EU should abandon their cautious stance both on the election results and police violence and put pressure on the Mozambican Government. A first step would be not only to identify irregularities, but also to clearly condemn electoral fraud and police violence, as has been done by other non-EU Western states, namely the U.S., Canada, Britain, Norway, and Switzerland. Other possible steps would be to threaten to temporarily freeze financial aid and development assistance to the country. This would be an effective measure in a country that is heavily dependent on donor support.
Reasons for Germany’s and the EU’s reluctance may include overriding interests in the resource-rich country, particularly in light of the oil and gas reserves discovered in the north of the country in 2017. Since then, the country has seen an increase in terrorist attacks, which the EU recently committed an additional EUR 20 million to combat.
Finally, developments in Mozambique also deserve wider media coverage. In the face of increasing police violence, media and public pressure on the government must be increased in order to facilitate a softening of the violent response to the demonstrators.
Magdalena Freischlad is a research associate at the University of Konstanz. She conducts research on reconciliation processes and local knowledge production in post-conflict societies, with a focus on Mozambique.
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doi:10.18449/2023MTA-PB18
